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Criminalizing the Armchair Terrorist:
Entrapment and the Domestic Terrorism
Prosecution
by DEJAN M. GANTAR*
Introduction
A variety of factors plague a defendant's rights in a domestic
terrorism trial. This Note focuses on contemporary domestic
terrorism prosecutions in which the defendants raise an entrapment
defense. It suggests that federal courts apply a lower standard for
prosecutors in proving predisposition by allowing nothing more than
evidence of a defendant's religious or political beliefs, or general
"impulse to lash out," to demonstrate predisposition. This Note
further argues that this evidentiary laxity establishes a double
standard in terrorism cases, and also manifests First Amendment
problems. The crux of this Note is that federal courts should refine
the entrapment doctrine within the terrorism-prosecution context.
Rather than modify the doctrine-which arguably would result in
convictions contrary to established precedent-federal courts should
treat terrorism-related offenses like any other traditional crime.
Further, the courts should exercise their inherent power to dismiss
charges on due process grounds when the government's conduct in
investigations is "outrageous" enough to violate fundamental notions
of fairness under the Due Process Clause. By doing the above,
federal courts would better preserve the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants, as well as distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate threats of terrorism.
Part I provides a general overview of the entrapment doctrine. It
describes the development of the judicially created doctrine, and the
approaches taken by the Supreme Court to establish the predominant
* J.D. Candidate 2015, U.C. Hastings, College of the Law. I am grateful to Professor
George Bisharat, who provided invaluable guidance and encouragement hroughout the
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test that is now almost universally used-dubbed the "subjective"
test-in which the court's main inquiry is the predisposition of the
defendant to commit the offense for which he or she is charged. Part
II argues that some recent cases suggest that federal courts have
lowered the standard for the prosecution to establish predisposition
in terrorism cases, effectively resulting in a double standard for
defendants charged with terrorism-related offenses. In addition, the
courts implicate First Amendment concerns by allowing the
prosecution to rely heavily on constitutionally protected material as
evidence of the defendant's predisposition to commit the offense.
Two contemporary terrorism cases, United States v. Cromitie' and
United States v. Siraj,2 outline these assertions. Part III proposes that
federal courts should dismiss terrorism cases in which sting operations
or acts of government inducement consist of "outrageous"
government conduct, based on a finding that they violate the
defendant's constitutional due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment. This part surveys the development of the "due process
defense" and asserts that particularly intrusive and expensive tactics
exercised by the government to entrap unwary defendants in
terrorism investigations warrant a finding of outrageousness.
I. The Entrapment Doctrine
Certain criminal offenses are difficult to detect by law
enforcement by virtue of their being committed privately between
consenting individuals.' Such crimes tend to lack actual "victims,"
and thus law enforcement agencies implement the use of informants
and provide "encouragement" for the commission of the actual
offenses.4 In doing so, the government agent seeks to simulate a
realistic environment in order to induce an individual to commit the
crime, while simultaneously gathering evidence for prosecution
Such inducement may involve appeals to personal considerations,
actual assistance in the planning of the crime, and the representation
of benefits to be derived from the offense.6
1. United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2013).
2. United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), affd, United States v.
Siraj, 533 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008).
3. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBST. CRIM. L. § 9.8 (2d ed. 2013).
4. Id.; see also Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125, 128
(2008).
5. LAFAVE, supra note 3.
6. Id.
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These law enforcement tactics were traditionally most often used
in "victimless" criminal activity, such as prostitution, counterfeiting,
and narcotics manufacturing. However, with the government's
increased focus on terrorism following the 9/11 attacks, law
enforcement agencies have formulated a "proactive" or "preventive"
orientation toward dealing with terrorism offenses.' Undeniably,
"[s]tate interests are particularly compelling in the terrorism context";
certainly more so than in traditional government sting operations,
which typically involve drugs or financial crimes.' This is a result of
the gravity of terrorism offenses and their potential to create many
victims, as well as impair national security generally. Indeed, such
"preventive" tactics signal a shift in terrorism investigations and
prosecutions, as, prior to 9/11, prosecutions generally focused on
punishing individuals implicated in terrorist-related crimes that had
already occurred.9
Perhaps even more so than the traditional crimes in which such
government tactics were utilized, "terrorism-related offenses
routinely involve individuals working together in close secrecy.""
This has led law enforcement agencies to develop more creative
tactics and increase the use of informants in investigating these types
of offenses." In addition, recent Federal Bureau of Investigations
("FBI") guidelines permit the agency to surveil and investigate
targets "without any particular factual predication."'2 In this vein, the
FBI formulated techniques that involve sending informants to
mosques in an effort to uncover possible terrorist threats without
articulable suspicion or probable cause.13
Given the existence of these types of law enforcement tactics,
some may find it unsurprising that the entrapment defense developed
in American jurisprudence. Furthermore, as terrorism sting
operations and prosecutions became more common in federal courts
following the 9/11 attacks, the defense has logically been extended to
the context of domestic terrorism prosecutions as well.
7. Id.
8. Kent Roach, Entrapment and Equality in Terrorism Prosecutions: A Comparative
Examination of North American and European Approaches, 80 MISS. L.J. 1455, 1456
(2011).
9. Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 430 (2007).
10. Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 688 (2010).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 708.
13. Id. at 710.
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Commentators have noted that courts expected to see a "surge in
terror-related entrapment cases" as a result of such law enforcement
14measures.
The entrapment defense, if raised successfully, bars the
conviction of a criminal defendant." The defendant must assert the
defense to the jury and argue that "but for the government's
inducement, he or she would have never committed the offense."'6
Because it is a judicially created doctrine and not a constitutional one,
no court is required to recognize the defense.1" Nevertheless, all
federal and state courts currently do.18 Although there are two
divergent approaches to the entrapment defense-dubbed the
"objective" and "subjective" tests-the defense generally requires
that the defendant was induced to commit the crime by the
government, that the defendant would not have committed the crime
but for the inducement, and that the government's conduct was based
on an effort to obtain evidence for prosecution.'9 When a defendant
raises an entrapment defense and puts the government inducement at
issue, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime prior to being
approached by the government.20 Whether or not the government
entrapped the defendant is generally a matter of fact for the jury,
although the court may find the defendant was entrapped as a matter
of law."
The entrapment doctrine dates back to 1915, when the Ninth
Circuit first evaluated a government scheme to induce the defendant
to smuggle Chinese immigrants over the Mexican border in Woo Wai
v. United States.22 There, the Ninth Circuit focused on the one and a
half-year period the government spent attempting to influence the
defendant to participate in the crime, until he "finally assented to
enter into the scheme."23 However, it was not until 1932 that the
14. Stevenson, supra note 4, at 129.
15. LAFAVE, supra note 3.
16. Stevenson, supra note 4, at 137.
17. Joshua Dressier & Alan C. Michaels, Criminal Procedure, Volume 1:
Investigation, 533 (6th ed. 2013).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 534.
21. Id.
22. Woo Wai v. United States, 233 F. 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1912).
23. Id. at 413-14.
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Supreme Court upheld a defense of entrapment.24 In Sorrells v.
United States,25 a government agent, posing as a World War I veteran,
induced the defendant, a "fellow" veteran to obtain whiskey
(outlawed during Prohibition) for him, but only after asking him
several times over the course of an hour.26 The Supreme Court
acknowledged that while the government may employ artifice and
stratagem to apprehend individuals involved in criminal activity, "[a]
different question is presented when the criminal design originates
with the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind of
an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and
induce its commission in order that they may prosecute."27
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have upheld and refined
the Sorrels defense of entrapment.28 In United States v. Russell, the
Court explained that "the principal element in the defense of
entrapment [is] the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime."29
This focus on the defendant's propensity to commit the crime for
which he or she is being charged has been preserved within the
approach to the entrapment defense and is now termed the
"subjective test."" Federal courts and the majority of state courts
follow this test." On the flip side is the "objective test," whereby the
court, rather than focusing on the defendant's predisposition to
commit the alleged offense, focuses on the conduct of the government
actors involved.32 In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has also noted
that there exists some possibility to dismiss charges against a
defendant on constitutional due process grounds where the conduct
of the government is so "outrageous" that it violates the defendant's
due process rights.33 Still, the Court has yet to dismiss a defendant's
charges on these grounds.
As noted above, in order for the government to annul the
defendant's entrapment claim, the government has the burden to
24. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 439-40.
27. Id. at 441-42.
28. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973).
29. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
30. Said, supra note 10, at 693.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Russell, 411 U.S. at 432; Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489
(1976).
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prove that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.34
Although the Supreme Court has, over the course of the past eighty
years, upheld the entrapment doctrine and articulated this test, the
Court has never explained how the government must prove a
defendant's predisposition. Generally, the essential inquiry
regarding predisposition is: what would the defendant have done had
law enforcement agents not intervened?36 Scholars have criticized
this inquiry, for "only a saint would not commit a crime given the
right inducement."37
The Court's most recent discussion of the predisposition test
within the entrapment context is Jacobson v. United States.38 Here,
the Court assessed a "56-year old veteran-turned-farmer['s]"
entrapment claim following his conviction for ordering child
pornography.9 The defendant argued that he was induced to commit
the crime as a result of the government's intricate, twenty-six-month-
long investigation, which consisted of a series of inquiries and
solicitations into his sexual inclinations.4° For two and a half years,
the government repeatedly made efforts, through "fictitious
organizations and a bogus pen pal, to explore petitioner's willingness
to break the.., law by ordering sexually explicit photographs of
children through the mail. 41  The Court upheld the defendant's
entrapment defense, a finding that was fueled largely by one critical
factor: Even though Jacobson had previously ordered child
pornography by mail (this was, after all, how he first came to the
government's attention), at the time he had initially done so, the
possession of child pornography was not yet illegal. 2
If the subjective test largely focuses on the actions of the
defendant, and inquires into defendant's predisposition to commit the
offense before the government approaches him or her, then it follows
that such an inquiry could raise specific issues within the context of
domestic terrorism trials.4'3 Terrorism trials are typically accompanied
34. Dressier & Michaels, supra note 17, at 534.
35. Said, supra note 10, at 696.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
39. Id. at 542.
40. Id. at 552-53.
41. Id. at 543.
42. Id. at 542-43.
43. Said, supra note 10, at 697.
[Vol. 42:1
FALL 2014] CRIMINALIZING THE ARMCHAIR TERRORIST 141
with evidence exhibiting the defendant's political and ideological
alignments.44 This, in turn, ties in with the government's attempt to
prove predisposition.45 In an effort to assess and illuminate these
issues, it is useful to review contemporary terrorism trials in which the
defendants raised entrapment claims.
II. The Standard in Contemporary Terrorism Trials
A. Cromitie and the Double Standard
Federal courts have experienced an increase in domestic
terrorism prosecutions following the 9/11 attacks.46 Muslim and Arab
men, unsurprisingly, are the typical defendants in these
prosecutions.47 Furthermore, the government commonly relies on
invasive, widespread surveillance and secret informants to investigate
these cases.' The government's conduct in some circumstances is
aggressive enough to raise due process concerns and has in turn
resulted in many defendants raising entrapment claims.49 However,
since the 9/11 attacks, not a single defendant charged with terrorism-
related offenses has achieved an acquittal as the result of a successful
entrapment defense.0
One high-profile terrorism prosecution in which the defendant
raised an entrapment defense is United States v. Cromitie5 In
Cromitie, four men were prosecuted and convicted in the Southern
District of New York for plotting to blow up two Bronx synagogues.52
None of the defendants had prior convictions related to terrorism.3
Further, the government failed to show that the defendants had any
connection to a terrorist organization before a government informant
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Amy Waldman, Prophetic Justice, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/prophetic-justice/5234/.
47. Id.
48. Stevenson, supra note 4, at 126.
49. See infra Part III.
50. Said, supra note 10, at 696-97. See generally Kevin A. Smith, Psychology,
Factfinding, and Entrapment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 759, 762 (2005) (explaining that although
statistical data on the general success of entrapment claims is difficult to come by,
anecdotally, it seems the defense is rarely successful).
51. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194.
52. Id. at 199.
53. Id. at 212.
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approached James Cromitie.14 Cromitie was a forty-two-year-old
Muslim man and had a history of petty drug offenses, for which he
had been repeatedly convicted.5 He worked at a Walmart store,
"earning less than $14,000 per year."56  The district court judge
referred to Cromitie as "an impoverished man."57
The inducement to engage in a terrorist attack was extensive and
aggressive, and was part of an elaborate sting operation. Shahed
Hussain led the inducement.8 Hussain was a government informant
and Pakistani national who was granted asylum by the United States
in the mid-1990s.59 After receiving asylum, he was convicted of fraud
and, to avoid deportation, began to work as a paid informant for the
FBI.' Hussain befriended Cromitie and over a period of several
months, planted the seeds of the government inducement. The
inducement consisted of promises of large sums of money upon
completion of the crime, luxury vehicles and all-expense-paid
vacations to Puerto Rico for Cromitie and his family.6 Hussain
provided the proposals for specific plans regarding the attack, as well
as all the necessary materials.62 Still, Cromitie did not evince a quick
and easy willingness to participate; during one of Hussain and
Cromitie's first encounters, Cromitie expressed his desire to
"straighten himself out," which was why he was "working hard.., at
Walmart.,63 At another point early on in the investigation, CrQmitie
expressed dubiousness regarding what good, if any, violent attacks in
the United States would bring to the Muslim cause.'
Almost a year into the investigation, Cromitie and Hussain even
lost touch for six weeks. Cromitie agreed to meet again and
subsequently carry out the plan only after Hussain offered him
$250,000 and additional encouragement for the completion of the
54. Id.
55. Id. at 200.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 199.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 211.
62. Id.
63. United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
64. Id. at 217.
65. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 202.
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crime.66 Following this contact, the many pieces of the government's
puzzle swiftly came together, as agents created phony Improvised
Explosive Devices ("IED") and stinger missiles, and Hussain
chauffeured Cromitie and the three co-defendants around New York
where they surveilled targets, purchased handguns, and even trained
the defendants in how to arm and plant the fake IED's and stinger
missiles.67 The government eventually arrested the four defendants
while they were planting the fake IED's in a Bronx synagogue.
6 8
Even with the clearly questionable and outrageous government
tactics used throughout the course of the investigation, the jury
concluded that the government did not entrap the defendants and
convicted them of various terrorism-related offenses. The Second
Circuit upheld the verdict.69
Because federal courts abide by the subjective test for
entrapment, the outrageousness of the government's conduct plays a
minor role in a finding of entrapment. Instead, once the District
Court accepted Cromitie's entrapment defense, the government had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cromitie was in fact
predisposed to commit the offense before government agents
approached him.7" Although this Note's author finds the stringent
subjective test an illogical one, for reasons not discussed here, the
argument below analyzes what is troublesome regarding the
subjective test in this context, rather than why it is generally
troublesome, and less favorable than the objective test.7'
Predisposition, the main inquiry of the subjective test, "focuses
upon whether the defendant was an unwary innocent or, instead, an
unwary criminal who readily availed himself of the opportunity to
perpetrate the crime."72  In 1933, the Second Circuit set forth the
66. Id. Cromitie contacted Hussain and shared his financial woes. In a recorded
conversation, Hussain then said, "I told you, I can make you 250,000 dollars, but you don't
want it brother. What can I tell you?" Id. at 219.
67. Joshua L. Dratel, The Literal Third Way in Approaching "Material Support for
Terrorism": Whatever Happened to 18 C. § 2339B(C) and the Civil Injunction Option?, 57
WAYNE L. REV. 11, 66 (2011).
68. Id.
69. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 199.
70. Id. at 204.
71. See Ronald J. Allen, Melissa Luttrell & Anne Kreeger, Clarifying Entrapment, 89
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 413 (1999). Although the subjective test does require
some form of government inducement, the sole focus on predisposition is meaningless, for
as Professor Ronald Allen argues, "only a saint would not commit a crime given the right
inducement." Sadie, supra note 10, at 696 (citing id.).
72. Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).
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three circumstances that establish predisposition within the Circuit:
''an existing course of similar criminal conduct; the accused's already
formed design to commit the crime or similar crimes, [or] his
willingness to do so, as evinced by ready complaisance."" This
prescribed paradigm created a problem for the Second Circuit in
Cromitie because Cromitie had no criminal history that indicated any
involvement in terrorism.74 Further, Cromitie was not "willing" to
commit the crime from the beginning; rather, he required several
months of government inducement before agreeing.7 Thus, ready
complaisance was also absent.76 The court's only option then was to
focus on Cromitie's "already formed design" to commit the crime or
similar crimes.
The focus on this "design" prong proved problematic in and of
itself, as the Supreme Court had never defined the term within the
context of entrapment.77 The Second Circuit concluded that "design"
must "take its meaning from the context of the type of criminal
activity comprising the specific offenses a defendant has committed.,
7
1
The problem of laxity regarding evidence for predisposition
manifested itself here, since Cromitie's criminal history lacked any
connection to terrorism. The court went on to state:
With respect to a category as varied as terrorist activity, the
requisite design in the mind of a defendant may be broader than the
design for other narrower forms of criminal activity. In view of the
broad range of activities that can constitute terrorism, especially with
respect to terrorist activities directed against the interests of the
United States, the relevant prior design need be only a rather
generalized idea or intent to inflict harm on such interests. A person
with such an idea or intent can readily be found to be "ready and
willing to commit the offence charged, whenever the opportunity
offered. ,
79
With this paragraph, the Second Circuit carved out a special
realm of the entrapment doctrine for crimes specifically related to
73. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933).
74. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 212.
75. Id.
76. Twenty years after the Becker opinion, the Second Circuit changed the wording
from "complaisance" to "compliance." This rephrasing did not change the three ways in
which the government may prove a defendant's predisposition. See id. at 205.
77. Id. at 206.
78. Id. at 207.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
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terrorism. By specifying that crimes of terrorism are more "varied"
than other forms of criminal activity, the court established a lower
standard for prosecutors when proving predisposition.80 This allowed
something as insignificant as a "generalized idea" to inflict harm on
the United States' interests to be sufficient for a finding of
predisposition, and thus sufficient to overcome an entrapment
defense.8' In other words, the defendant need not have an already
formed "design" to commit the specific offense for which he or she is
prosecuted, but rather must only possess any state of mind that in any
way inclines him or her to "inflict harm on the United States.,
82
This standard is particularly troublesome because there is
essentially no limit to the kind of evidence the prosecution may
present to show predisposition-no matter how attenuated, it may be
offered against the defendant. This leaves little room for the fact
finder to conclude anything other than the absence of entrapment,
and convict the defendant. The standard suggests that even feeble
evidence showing the defendant's possession of literature authored by
a known terrorist, or perhaps a Google search for "how to build a
bomb," would suffice to demonstrate predisposition.83  Similar
problems arose in Cromitie.
As mentioned above, post-Jacobson, the court's inquiry into the
defendant's predisposition focuses on the defendant's design prior to
the government agent making contact. The Cromitie court looked at
statements Cromitie made to the government informant during their
initial introduction.84 Though the statements were inflammatory,
many of them simply constituted religious notions that the dissenting
judge referred to as "boastful piety of a foolish man" and "banter in
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 207-08.
83. As of now, the author is unaware of an entrapment case in which the defendant
was convicted purely on such evidence. However, defendants charged with terrorism-
related offenses have nonetheless been convicted largely as a result of such evidence. See,
e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic
Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833 (2011) (discussing United States v. Hayat, 710 F.3d
875 (9th Cir. 2013)). In order to prove the defendant's mens rea in providing material
support for terrorism, the prosecution relied almost exclusively on a note found in the
defendant's wallet, which translated to "[l]ord, let us be at their throats, and we ask you to
give us refuge from their evil." Id. at 843. To demonstrate that this text was evidence of
mens rea, the prosecutor proffered expert testimony that stated the note was a prayer
"used by Muslim fanatics and extremists that consider themselves to be in a state of war
with the rest of the world or their own government." Id. The actual meaning behind the
text was disputed all through appeal. See id.
84. Cromitie. 727 F.3d at 200.
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any faculty lounge.,85 These statements included Cromitie's remarks
that he wanted "to die like a shahid, a martyr" and that he wanted to
"do something to America."86  The Cromitie court found the
defendant predisposed to commit the crime based on his "sense of
grievance or... impulse to lash out."' The dissent objected that such
grievances and impulses are in most cases benign."
The sentencing opinion raises additional concerns on the issue of
predisposition. There, the court refused to sentence Cromitie to life,
as recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, on the basis
that the government, not Cromitie, first introduced the idea of
attacks.89 The court further stated that "[tihe defendants were not
engaged in any terrorist activity before they encountered the
[informant]. In fact, they were not engaged in any sort of criminal
activity at all."'
The Cromitie opinion is one example of a federal court giving in
to current political tides and lowering the prosecution's burden to
establish predisposition in a terrorism-related entrapment case. This
ultimately led to a conviction, which, if decided under the traditional
entrapment paradigm, would not stand. Such a holding establishes an
uneasy precedent as it creates laxity for the prosecution to establish
predisposition. In Cromitie, the defendant never actually committed
any prior similar offenses, evinced ready willingness to commit the
offense or possessed even a "generalized idea... to inflict harm."91
Yet, prosecutors established predisposition by showing the
defendant's mere alignment with a certain religious or political belief,
or impulse to lash out. Such a standard runs contrary to established
precedent because, as the dissent argued, a "generalized idea.., to
inflict harm" on the interests of the United States is not an "already
formed design" to commit the crime; the "generalized idea of an act is
not a disposition to do it."9'
85. Id. at 230 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 212.
87. Id. at 229 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. United States v. Cromitie, No. 09 Cr. 558(CM), 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 2693297, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2011).
90. Id. at *3.
91. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 207.
92. Id. at 228 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("The majority opinion renders entrapment
untenable as a defense. Unsurprisingly, the majority's definition [of 'already formed
design'] is incompatible with precedent.").
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Federal courts should not reshape the entrapment doctrine in an
attempt to force it into a mold that it clearly does not fit. By treating
terrorism-related offenses within the entrapment context the same as
any other traditional crime, the courts would preserve established
precedents and, in turn, prevent the questionable convictions of
defendants that would otherwise be acquitted under the traditional
standard. In addition, the courts would escape the risk of providing
juries with a faulty foundation to convict defendants who, without the
aid and inducement of the government, would pose no legitimate
-threat to the United States and its interests.
B. Siraj and the First Amendment Problem
Another high profile terrorism prosecution in which the
defendant raised an entrapment defense is Siraj.93 Shahawar Siraj was
a twenty-four-year-old Pakistani immigrant.94 He was convicted of
several conspiracy counts relating to an alleged plot to blow up a
subway station in New York City.
95 He was young, impressionable 1
and, again, had no prior convictions or connections relating to
terrorist activity.97  Osama Eldawoody, the chief government
informant, was a fifty-one-year-old Egyptian immigrant.9' During his
tenure as a government informant, Eldawoody frequented New York
City mosques and conducted surveillance on congregants.9  Upon
finding Siraj, the inducement began: Eldawoody initially suggested
the proposed attack and the method to create a bomb."° Eldawoody
further created a phony organization, dubbed "the Brotherhood,"
which-he told Siraj-would supply the materials necessary to carry
out the attack.'°' Eldawoody was the main witness for the
government at trial.'2
Siraj's entrapment defense was, like Cromitie's, based largely on
his absence of predisposition to commit the crime for which he was
93. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408.
94. Said, supra note 10, at 715.
95. Id.
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being charged."3 The evidence entered against Siraj was, in many
ways, weak: Eldawoody lacked credibility because he was a
government informant who frequented mosques in order to target
individuals like Siraj.1' 4 Another government witness was Siraj's co-
conspirator, a nineteen-year-old schizophrenic, who agreed to
cooperate with the government0 5 In an effort to bolster the assertion
that Siraj did in fact possess predisposition, the government entered
into evidence a variety of constitutionally protected materials,
including books and videos that the defendant possessed that praised
so-called violent jihad and testimony regarding the defendant's
approval of Osama Bin Laden.'°6 Siraj raised the First Amendment
concerns during the trial and the court responded:
Defendant also argues that allowing the undercover
officer's testimony raises "considerable First
Amendment concerns" by criminalizing legitimate
political discourse. However, even if the undercover
officer testified to statements made by defendant
that may be described as reflecting defendant's
political views, those statements were properly
admitted as discussed above. That defendant's
statements contain political expression does not
insulate defendant from their use at trial where the
statements also rebut his testimony and prove
predisposition.7
So what exactly is the issue with admitting such evidence against a
defendant in an effort to prove predisposition? After all, the
Jacobson court did state that relevant evidence of what a defendant
does or says prior to government contact is admissible"8 First and
foremost, it should be noted that the court's response to Siraj's First
Amendment concern is rather bare in its reasoning. It does not
address the prejudicial effect of the evidence, nor more importantly,
does it touch on the actual First Amendment concern: the notion that
heavy reliance on such evidence could have an effect of criminalizing
103. Said, supra note 10, at 717.
104. Id. at 716.
105. Id. at 717.
106. Id.
107. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
108. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549 n.2.
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political expression or speech. The court shrugs off the argument and
simply restates what it already asserted: that the evidence proves
predisposition.'9 Nonetheless, such admissions of evidence certainly
do possess an eerie tint of criminalizing religious and political
beliefs."' By admitting such evidence against a defendant to prove his
predisposition for an act of terrorism, absent additional stronger
evidence, the court makes the mere possession of such material (and
the inferred belief in the ideology it promulgates) a proof of the
propensity to commit violent terrorist acts.'
This suggests that any defendant who possesses ome religious or
political belief deemed contrary to the United States interests-
regardless of how benign the belief is or how peaceful the
individual-is effectively precluded from raising a successful
entrapment defense. This is precisely what happened in Sira: The
court and the jury construed the defendant's religious and political
beliefs as evidence of his predisposition to commit acts of violence. 2
Without strong, direct evidence, the government then leaned on other
"proxies"-or used them to bolster other weaker evidence-including
religious speech and political ideology, in an effort to show a
predisposition to commit violent acts."3 This is further problematic
because it facilitates a notion that Muslims, who espouse anti-United
States opinions and possess jihadist literature and other provocative
materials, are "criminals just waiting for an opportunity to transform
rhetoric into action.' ' 14 It also implicates the notion that a Muslim
defendant prosecuted for terrorism has substantially fewer rights than
a non-Muslim in the same position.
This Note does not assert that the government should be barred
from entering such evidence against a defendant in a terrorism trial
simply because it expounds the defendant's political or religious
beliefs. Rather, this Note questions whether such heavy reliance on
this type of "proxy" evidence is constitutional. Beyond the effect of
practically placing criminal sanctions on certain political and religious
beliefs, a heavy reliance on such evidence also implicates First
109. See Wadie E. Said, The Message and Means of the Modern Terrorism
Prosecution, 21 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 191-92 (2012) (noting the
court's reasoning as a "because I said so" mentality).
110. Waldman, supra note 46.
111. Said, supra note 10, at 717.
112. Id. at 717-18.
113. Huq, supra note 84, at 836.
114. Dratel, supra note 68, at 73.
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Amendment protections of freedom of religion and expressive
association.'15
This concern was previously raised by scholars within the context
of government surveillance of individuals because of their political
associations.'16 However, in the context of inducement-based law
enforcement practices that revolve around terrorist plots, rather than
merely being investigated or surveilled, defendants risk losing their
liberty for their associations and beliefs. Allowing the prosecution to
heavily rely on evidence pertaining to the defendant's objectionable
political or religious beliefs, in absence of strong, direct evidence of
predisposition, could certainly chill entire communities' freedoms of
expression and association."7  The right of association is
unequivocally infringed when organizations "must abandon or alter
activities protected by the First Amendment."'' i  In Siraj, the
government agents frequented mosques, specifically targeting
individuals who possessed such beliefs."9 The government informant
happened to come across Siraj, a young and impressionable Muslim,
who had no prior connections to terrorism. Following the rejection of
Siraj's entrapment defense, it seems that his viewpoints prior to the
government inducement are essentially what led to his conviction
since the government lacked credible or strong evidence of his actual
predisposition to commit the substantive offense. Thus, it follows
that this type of targeting by the government could chill the exercise
of First Amendment rights in certain communities.
The government employs invasive and inducement-based
techniques by targeting a very specific group of people: young,
religious, and unsophisticated Muslim men. Undeniably, some of
115. See Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling,
Surveillance, and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621 (2004). "[T]here is a risk
that increased security measures will unduly focus on individuals and groups unlikely to be
involved in terrorism. Those likely to be targeted by law enforcement, such as Muslims
attending mosques or political dissidents protesting war in Iraq, can face repercussions
considerably more serious than waiting in line to pass through a metal detector." Id. at
622. It should be noted that in the entrapment context, these First Amendment
implications only truly arise if the defendant's thoughts and beliefs are followed by some
kind of action.
116. See, e.g., id.; Roach, supra note 8; Michael R. Blood, FBI Director Defends Use of
Informants in Mosques, MSNBC.COM (June 8, 2009, 9:48 PM), http://www.nbcnews.
com/id/31177049/.
117. See Fisher, supra note 116, at 624 ("Targets of political surveillance typically
report being chilled in the exercise of their rights to engage in free speech and the free
exercise of religion").
118. Id. at 637.
119. See Waldman, supra note 46.
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these individuals are engaged in lawful activities-including religious
and political expression-even though their viewpoints may run
contrary to those of the government.120 The upshot is that terrorism
prosecutions, where the government heavily relies on constitutionally
protected material to prove the defendant's predisposition, inevitably
chills the exercise of political and religious expression and association
by this group. If the government can use this type of evidence to
secure a conviction, despite a defendant's entrapment claim, it follows
that people within this targeted group would fear expressing their
viewpoints and refrain from associations with others who possess
their viewpoints. This runs contrary to the primary goal of the First
Amendment: guaranteeing a "marketplace of ideas," where truth and
honest debate emerge from a multiplicity of voices.21
Cases like Siraj set murky precedent that suggest that even in an
exceptionally weak terrorism case, where the prosecution has very
little to rely on in terms of establishing a defendant's predisposition,
evidence of the defendant's political or religious beliefs alone could
pass muster and trump an entrapment claim. This reliance is
problematic because such beliefs, standing alone, are not directly
linked to a factual predisposition to commit violent acts. It thus
creates a foundation for a jury to convict a defendant even though
entrapment exists as a matter of law. Furthermore, First Amendment
issues arise because this type of reliance potentially chills religious
and associative freedoms.
IH. "Outrageous Government Conduct" and the
"Due Process Defense"
The government expends vast resources to investigate terrorism
cases.12 Everything from informant salaries, to delegating agents, to
cultivating imaginary plots shows that substantial resources are spent
to apprehend would-be terrorists working at the direction of a
government informant.123 Prosecuting these cases is expensive too:
Terrorism cases are complex and sometimes require years to
litigate-for example, in Cromitie's trial, the government informant's
120. See Fisher, supra note 116, at 622.
121. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
122. See Waldman, supra note 46.
123. Id.
testimony lasted thirteen days24 and the jury deliberated for eight. 5
The risk of entrapment increased following the government's reliance
on these tactics and the use of confidential informants.2 6 Also, these
types of investigations raise issues regarding the proportionality of
the punishments: It is not always clear what crime, if any, the
defendant would have committed had it not been for the
encouragement and assistance of a government informant.2 7 This
problem is evident in Cromitie and Siraj, where poor and
unsophisticated defendants, with no prior connection to terrorist
activity, were encouraged and assisted by the government to plot
terrorist attacks.
In a 1985 article, Judge Richard Posner explores the economic
viability of undercover tactics that induce defendants to commit
crimes, for which the defendants are subsequently prosecuted.'2
Posner argues that such police tactics are perfectly lawful, and
generally make economic sense, for it is likely that the person who
the police induced to commit the crime will commit those same
crimes in the future.29 Thus, it is "cheaper" to catch the individual "in
an arranged crime than in his ordinary criminal activities.""'3 The
problem, Posner argues, is when the police, rather than just
simulating the defendant's "normal criminal opportunities," induce
the defendant o commit a crime that he or she would never commit
in his "ordinary opportunity."'' Posner further states:
The police offer a poor man who has no criminal
record one thousand dollars to steal a bicycle; he
does so, and is arrested. The resources used to
apprehend and convict the man of bicycle theft are
socially wasted, because they do not prevent any
crimes. Had it not been for the police offer, he
would not have stolen a bicycle .... Nothing is
124. Tom Hays, 4 Men are Convicted in NY Synagogue-Bombing Plot, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 18, 2010, 2:14 PM),
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local&id=7731175.
125. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 204.
126. Dratel, supra note 68, at 60.
127. Id. at 61.
128. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193 (1985).
129. Id. at 1220.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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achieved by the police conduct except deflating
scarce resources from genuine crime prevention.3 '
It begs the question: What crimes, if any, would the defendants in
Cromitie and Sira] have committed if the government never
approached them in the first place? Had it not been for his initial
meeting with the government informant, Cromitie would likely never
have been arrested for terrorist activity.'33 It is unquestionable that
the government's conduct in the investigation played a significant role
in getting Cromitie to agree to commit the acts for which he was
subsequently convicted. But just how outrageous need the
government's conduct be to warrant a dismissal of charges against an
unwary induced defendant? Precedent tells us that there is perhaps a
threshold for outrageous government conduct that when reached,
may result in the dismissal of charges under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
The first Supreme Court case to entertain this idea was United
States v. Russell.' In Russell, the defendant was convicted on
narcotics charges and raised an entrapment defense on the grounds
that the undercover agents provided him with an ingredient necessary
for the manufacture of methamphetamine, and that this particular
ingredient was difficult to obtain, making it essential for the
commission of the crime."' The Court found that because the
defendant was an "active participant in an illegal drug manufacturing
enterprise which began before the government had [made contact
with him]," his entrapment defense was unwarranted."6 In other
words, the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense before
being approached by the government and thus failed to meet a vital
element of the defense.
The Court also assessed the defendant's second theory of
defense: that the case warranted dismissal on due process grounds as
132. Id.
133. James Cromitie routinely displayed his unsophisticated demeanor and lack of
experience throughout the entire inducement process. This included routinely forgetting
"code words," an inability to make the fake bombs "operational," and forgetting to set the
timer on one of the fake bombs. Francesca Laguardia, Terrorists, Informants, and
Buffoons: The Case for Downward Departure as a Response to Entrapment, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 172, 195 (2013).
134. Russell, 411 U.S. 423.
135. Id. at 424-26.
136. Id. at 436.
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a result of the government's "outrageous" conduct.137 The Court
found that the conduct of the agents was not sufficiently outrageous
to justify dismissal on due process grounds, but left open the
possibility of such a defense.38 The Court said: "While we may some
day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction, the instant case is distinctly not of that
breed. ,1
39
Three years later, the Court revisited the due process defense in
Hampton v. United States.'°  There, the defendant-convicted of
heroin distribution-raised an entrapment defense, asserting that the
heroin he sold to an undercover agent was supplied to him by another
undercover agent.14' The Court, finding that the defendant had been
predisposed to commit the offense, affirmed the conviction, but wrote
three separate opinions. ' The plurality opinion, written by Justice
Rehnquist, and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White,
argued that predisposition should completely bar not only the
entrapment defense, but also the due process defense.43 Justice
Powell's concurrence asserted the converse and stated that even if
predisposition was present, the defendant should not be precluded
from raising the due process defense.'" The dissent argued that the
entrapment doctrine should be modified to focus not on the
defendant's predisposition, but rather the government's conduct.
145
The above cases illustrate that a due process defense is available
for a defendant whose commission of a crime was fueled by
"outrageous government conduct" that is "shocking to the universal.
sense of justice" mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
137. Id. at 428, 431.
138. Id. at 432.
139. Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court explained that the agent contributed a
legal ingredient that may have been difficult, though not impossible to obtain. This
conduct, the Court said, falls "short of violating.., fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice, mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
Id.
140. Hampton, 425 U.S. 484.
141. Id. at 487.
142. Id. at 484.
143. Id. at 490.
144. Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 497-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Amendment.1 6 As noted above, the Court has yet to establish what
constitutes conduct sufficient to warrant dismissal of charges on due
process grounds. However, by applying the facts of these cases, along
with federal circuit opinions, a hazy template exists providing some
insight.
In addition, federal courts have not completely shied away from
accepting the due process defense. For example, in United States v.
Twigg,'7 the Third Circuit dismissed charges on due process grounds
against one defendant convicted for methamphetamine
manufacturing.4 8  The court found that the government agents'
conduct was so overreaching, that it barred prosecution.9 In Twigg,
the government agents greatly assisted the defendant in setting up the
methamphetamine operation by acquiring "the necessary equipment,
raw materials and a production site."'5°  Moreover, it was the
government that initially hatched the plan."'
The Third Circuit said that the defendant was predisposed to
commit the offense, evidenced by his "apparent willingness to
participate in the manufacturing venture.'52 Thus, the dismissal was
not the result of a successful entrapment claim.153 Relying on the
Supreme Court's opinions in Russell and Hampton, the Third Circuit
found that even if a defendant's predisposition barred an entrapment
defense, the theory of fundamental fairness precluded conviction,
where police conduct is "outrageous."'54  In an attempt to solidify
what constituted such conduct, the Third Circuit looked to prior
cases"' in which charges were dismissed on due process grounds.
Based on the principles outlined by those cases, the court concluded
that barring the prosecution of the defendant was warranted because
the governmental involvement in the criminal activities had reached
"a demonstrable level of outrageousness.'56
146. Russell, 411 U.S at 432.
147. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
148. ld.
149. Id. at 382.
150. Id. at 375.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 376.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 378-79.
155. Id. at 379.
156. Id. at 380.
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Twigg, decided almost forty years ago, has received a substantial
amount of negative treatment from various courts, including the
Cromitie court.'57 However, the courts in most of these cases did not
doubt the validity of the due process defense theory-rather they
distinguished their facts from Twigg.'58 Nonetheless, the possibility, as
outlined by the Supreme Court in Russell, still stands: if a defendant
commits a crime as a result of government inducements that entail
outrageous conduct, then the defendant could have his or her charges
dismissed based on a finding that the government conduct violated
fundamental notions of justice guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause.'59
As noted above, there is no clear standard for what constitutes
outrageous government conduct. Still, the Supreme Court and other
federal cases provide a rough roadmap. For example, in Russell, the
Court found that the government's conduct, which consisted of
providing the defendant with a difficult to obtain chemical to
manufacture drugs for which he was convicted, stopped "far short of
violating.., fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice, mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."' The Court further justified its finding on practical
grounds noting that the manufacture of drug is a "continuing...
business enterprise" that requires that law enforcement rely on
infiltration tactics since they are left with few other practical ways to
apprehend individuals involved in such crimes.' One essential factor
that swayed the Court away from finding outrageous conduct was that
the defendant was an "active participant in... [the] enterprise...
157. See, e.g., Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 225. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 225 ("[Twigg] has
never been followed.., and conduct equally reprehensible has been repeatedly found not
to violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights in other courts."). See also United
States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206
(E.D.N.Y. 1981). But see, United States v. Solorio, 37 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Solario, No. 94-50443, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 10364, at *3 (9th Cir. 1995)
(initially reversing the defendant's drug conviction on an outrageous conduct theory
because the amount the government paid the informant was dependent on the defendant's
eventual conviction and the quantity of drugs involved, but later withdrawing its opinion
on a theory that the defendant lacked standing to assert the claim).
158. See, e.g., U.S. v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Westmoreland, 712 F.3d 1066, 1072 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d
370, 373 (2d Cir. 1983).
159. Russell, 411 U.S at 432.
160. Id. (citing Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)).
161. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432.
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before the government agent appeared on the scene."'62 In Twigg, on
the other hand, the Third Circuit found that the government conduct
violated basic principles of due process, largely based on the
following factors: the government supplied the defendant with
essential ingredients for methamphetamine manufacturing; the
expense of the chemical; and the significant assistance provided by
the government in the narcotics manufacturing.'
Using these cases as a backdrop to assess the facts of Cromitie
and Siraj (and further to consider future entrapment cases in the
terrorism context), it is possible to extrapolate certain facts which, in
their aggregate, could potentially meet the threshold for outrageous
government conduct. The defendants in Cromitie and Siraj did not
participate in terrorist-related criminal activity prior to the
inducements.'6' This is unlike Russell, Hampton, and Twigg, where
the defendants were active participants in their respective criminal
enterprises before government agents approached them.
Furthermore, in Hampton and Russell, the defendants themselves
conceived the crime, whereas in Cromitie and Siraj, it was the
government agents that initially planned the crimes. In Cromitie, the
agent supplied almost all of the necessary materials for the offense
and played an integral role in the plot. This is distinguishable from
Russell, where the agents supplied only one ingredient that the
defendants could have obtained without government assistance.
Further, it is unlikely that the unsophisticated defendants in
Cromitie and Siraj could have obtained the materials provided to
them by the government.65 In Twigg, the government provided the
defendants with a location to manufacture the drugs, whereas the
government agents in Cromitie not only provided the necessary
materials and specific stratagems for the plot, but also offered the
defendants large sums of money, luxury vehicles and all-expense-paid
vacations for their families.166 Thus, the government conduct in
Hampton and Russell is modest as compared to the conduct in
Cromitie and Siraj. The same can be said for the government conduct
in Twigg, which still stands as good law. It follows then that
government conduct exemplified in Cromitie and Siraj should bar
prosecution of defendants on due process grounds.
162. Id. at 436.
163. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 376.
164. See supra Part II.
165. Id.
166. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 211.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Turning back to Judge Posner's argument regarding economic
pragmatism,"' it is questionable whether such extensive and heavily
funded inducement practices exercised by the government in would-
be-terrorist cases serve any substantial long-term benefit. This is
because, as Judge Posner asserts, the agents are simulating an
environment that the defendant would not otherwise find himself
in." Indeed, defendants that are impressionable, whether as a result
of their age, poverty, or something else, would likely never find the
means to facilitate the type of terrorist acts the government imagines
for them. Certainly there exists a possibility that an actual
sophisticated terrorist, like one that Hussain claimed to be, could
approach such an individual and coax him or her into engaging in a
terrorist plot, but that delves too far into a conjectural world.'69 The
plot to blow up the synagogue in Cromitie and the conspiracy to
bomb the subway station in Siraj were the poor man's stolen bicycle
in Posner's hypothetical; it is simply too contentious a claim that the
defendant would have committed a terrorist-related crime but for the
government's inducement. Thus, government resources used to
apprehend defendants in such circumstances are "socially wasted...
because they do not prevent any crimes.
170
Following Judge Posner's logic, the question is whether such
inducements are actually preventing real terrorist attacks from
occurring, or whether they are simply draining scarce resources from
a government that could otherwise be preventing actual crime. By
finding that the government conduct in cases like that of James
Cromitie and Shahawar Siraj is sufficiently outrageous to constitute a
dismissal of the charges on due process grounds, the courts would not
only be protecting the due process rights of criminal defendants, but
also making important distinctions between legitimate and
illegitimate threats of terrorism. A defendant who actually possesses
the will and design to commit a terrorist attack would certainly not
require such extensive and extraordinary inducement, for, like the
defendants in Hampton and Russell, he or she would already be an
167. Posner, supra note 129.
168. Id. at 1220.
169. The issue with this line of thought is that it only exists in the abstract. Just
because the defendant could have been approached by an actual terrorist and induced to
commit a crime should not rectify the government's conduct. Every individual can be
considered "inducement-bait," and that theory alone should not justify an ordinary
individual's conviction. As noted above, "only a saint would not commit a crime given the
right inducement." Sadie, supra note 10, at 696 (discussing Allen, supra note 72, at 413).
170. Posner, supra note 129, at 1220.
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active participant in such an enterprise, or could obtain the necessary
materials without the direction of the agents.
Conclusion
Recent domestic terrorism cases suggest that some federal courts
are modifying the entrapment doctrine, effectively lowering the
standard for the prosecution to demonstrate a defendant's
predisposition. By permitting increased laxity for the prosecution to
offer such evidence, the courts are establishing an uneasy precedent:
Prosecutors are allowed to admit evidence against that would not pass
muster in a traditional criminal prosecution in which an entrapment
defense is raised. By doing so, the federal courts have established a
double standard for criminal defendants charged with terrorism-
related offenses. This evidentiary laxity has also led to a First
Amendment problem, particularly because the typical defendant in a
contemporary terrorism case is Muslim and possesses inflammatory
or radical beliefs. This evidentiary laxity has the effect of putting a
defendant's religious and political beliefs on trial. Further, it has the
potential to chill religious and political expression and association.
By treating the entrapment doctrine in terrorism cases as the
same as any other traditional crime involving government
inducement, federal courts would preserve entrapment doctrine
precedent, as well as the First Amendment rights of individuals who
are prosecuted for terrorism. By disfavoring reliance on evidence
regarding the defendant's religious and political beliefs, the courts
would minimize the risk of providing the jury with a foundation to
convict, when there should be a finding of entrapment as a matter of
law. In addition, the courts would protect defendants from having
their political and religious beliefs criminalized, effectively
safeguarding First Amendment protections.
On the other hand, even if a court concludes that a defendant
induced by the government to plot a phony terrorist attack possessed
the predisposition to commit the offense, there are circumstances in
which the defendant should have his or her charges dismissed on due
process grounds. The government expends vast resources to
investigate individuals and induce them to commit acts of •ros.
The Supreme Court has never heard a case in which it dismissed a
defendant's charges pursuant to this theory. However, prior cases in
which the defense was discussed, along with the holdings of other
171. See Waldman, supra note 46.
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federal courts, provide a backdrop for assessing when a defendant
should have the defense available. When law enforcement agents
seek out young, unsophisticated individuals and exploit their
impressionability and religious beliefs in an attempt to coax them to
commit highly intricate acts of terrorism by promising, amongst other
things, large sums of money, and provide all the necessary materials
and plans for the fake attack, the federal courts should dismiss the
charges on due process grounds.
Despite the Supreme Court never having established exactly
what "outrageous conduct" sufficient to warrant dismissal on due
process grounds is, the government conduct in the cases where the
Court does discuss the defense is modest when compared to the
example cases of Cromitie and Siraj. Aside from upholding the
notion of fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Constitution, such
findings would also bear positive policy implications by deterring the
government from expending large resources on investigating and
entrapping individuals who, realistically speaking, likely pose no
serious threat to the United States' interests in the first place.
As a closing thought, the author hopes to convey that the balance
between the preservation of national security (facilitated by
inducement-based law enforcement techniques and followed by
terrorism-related prosecutions) and constitutional rights need not be
a binary paradigm. Society bore witness to this faulty notion, for
example, when the Supreme Court held in Korematsu v. United
States' that the constitutional rights of a specific class of citizens
could be suspended, justified by the government's claim that such
measures were warranted under national security concerns.'73 The
significance is simple: political winds break hard and the past should
always serve as a reminder for courts to be independent, neutral, and
uninfluenced by the overwrought claims of the government, even in
times of political and social tension.
172. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
173. Id.
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